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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
TAM T. NGUYEN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 950788-CA 
Priority No. 2 
AMENDED1 BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the from the sentence and commitment order of the Third 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, 
presiding. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(f) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Two related issues are now presented for review: whether Judge Rigtrup abused his 
discretion in ordering consecutive sentences because Appellant's history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs do not reasonably justify a consecutive sentence under the circumstances, 
1
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and whether Judge Rigtrup failed to act on reasonably reliable and relevant information in 
ordering consecutive sentences, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-401(3) (Supp 
1995), and contrary to the requirements of State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1993), State 
v. Smith. 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995), State v. Strunk. 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993), and State v. 
Lee. 656 P.2d 443 (Utah 1982). 
A sentence will be overturned on appeal if the trial court has abused its discretion, 
failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds legally 
prescribed limits. State v. Gibbons. 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted); 
State v. Shelbv. 728 P.2d 987 (Utah 1986). In State v. Russell. 791 P.2d 188 (Utah 1990), the 
supreme court stated that an "abuse of discretion may be manifest if the actions of the judge in 
sentencing were 'inherently unfair' or if the judge imposed a 'clearly excessive' sentence." Id. 
at 192-93 (citation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
UTAH CONSTITUTION. Article 1 Section 7 (Supp. 1995): 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION. Article 1 Section 9 (Supp. 1995): 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall 
cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be 
treated with unnecessary rigor. 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-401 (Supp. 1995): 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences 
for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the 
court states in the sentences that they shall run consecutively. 
(3) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the 
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history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining 
whether to impose consecutive sentences. 
Utah Code Annotated g 77-184 (Supp. 1995): 
(6)(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation 
report at the time of sentencing, the matter shall be considered to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or 
information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present 
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information 
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, Tarn Nguyen ("Tarn"), was arraigned on charges of capital murder and 
aggravated robbery, to which Tarn plead not guilty. A jury trial was held in August, 1995, 
resulting in a conviction of Manslaughter, a second degree felony, and Theft, a second degree 
felony. Appellant's sentencing hearing was held October 23, 1995. The Third District Court, 
the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, presiding, sentenced Tarn to consecutive terms of one to 
fifteen years for each conviction. The Sentence (Commitment) order was signed October 24, 
1995, by the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup. R. 1778-1779. On November 22, 1995, Tarn, 
through his present counsel, filed his notice of appeal of the sentence. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
There are essentially two versions of the facts surrounding Chet Harris' death - the 
version which came out at Tarn's interrogation, and the version that was testified to at trial. 
The transcript of the interrogation was admitted as State's Exhibit 31 at trial and is attached 
hereto as Appendix C. The Presentence Investigation Report ("P.I.R.") prepared by C. Todd 
Orgill of Adult Probation and Parole Department, found at pages 1783 to 1803 of the record, 
contains an "Official Version of Offense" and "Defendant's Version of Offense." The source 
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of the "Official Version of Offense" is the Salt Lake Police Department report for this case (R. 
1785). "Defendant's Version of Offense" in the P.I.R. is a handwritten statement submitted by 
Tam (R. 1787). 
On or August 23, 1993, Tam was arrested in connection with the alleged homicide and 
robbery of Chet Harris. Prior to that arrest, Tam was arrested on or about August 22, 1993, 
in La Grande, Oregon in connection with an accident involving Mr. Harris1 car. Tam was 
placed on a Greyhound bus by the local police, and arrested by officers of the Salt Lake Police 
Department as he exited the bus. R. 1785. 
On August 22, 1993, at around 1:00 a.m., Tam and Tuanen Ly, co-defendant, were 
dropped off in the downtown Salt Lake City area by a friend. Tam and Mr. Ly walked to 
around 300 South Main Street in Salt Lake City. In Tarn's interrogation he never stated a clear 
reason why he was downtown that evening. In his version of the offense and at trial he 
stated that he and Mr. Ly's purpose in going to that area was to meet an associate, Mihn 
Nguyen, at Hardee's to give him his gun back. R. 1786; R. 1639. While Tam and Mr. Ly 
were still in that area, they met Mr. Harris who offered to give Tam a ride home. R. 1642; R. 
1786. Mr. Harris was drinking beer. R. 1786; R. 1655. Tam accepted Mr. Harris' offer to 
take him home, and got in Mr. Harris' car. 
Instead of taking Tam home, Mr. Harris drove to a parking lot to drink more beer and 
began talking to Tam. While Tam and Mr. Harris were parked there, Mr. Harris made sexual 
advances on Tam and sexually assaulted him by reaching down his pants and fondling his 
genitals. R. 1647. At that time, Tam demanded that Mr. Harris stop his advances, pushed 
him away, and exited Mr. Harris' car to escape the assault. Mr. Harris then got out of his car 
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and told Tarn that he would take back to where he had picked him up. Tarn then got back in 
Mr. Harris' car and they drove back to 300 South Main Street, where they met Tuanen Ly 
again. R. 1653. Upon arriving at this location, Mr. Harris picked up Mr. Ly and agreed to 
drive them both to Appellant's residence. 
Tarn told Ly in Vietnamese that Mr. Harris had sexually assaulted him. Ly reacted 
with anger to this. Mr. Harris drove Tarn and Ly to Appellant's residence. Tarn directed Mr. 
Harris to an alley behind his residence. Mr. Harris stopped the car. All three persons got out 
of the car. 
Mr. Harris again assaulted Tarn, and Tarn shot Mr. Harris once in the neck with a 
handgun he had in his possession that night. R. 1662-1664. Tarn and Ly then drove off in 
Mr. Harris' car. After driving a short distance, they stopped, and then returned to where Mr. 
Harris was shot. Mr. Ly asked Tarn for the gun, and Tarn complied. R. 1670. Mr. Ly then 
got out of the car shot Mr. Harris in the head while Tarn sat in the car. R. 1673. Ly and Tarn 
then fled in Mr. Harris' car. 
Later that day, August 22, 1993, Tarn, Ly, and a third individual, Mihn Nguyen, 
departed for Seattle, Washington in Mr. Harris' car. While in La Grande, Oregon, they got in 
an accident. Tuanen Ly and Tarn were later arrested by the local police. A pat-down search 
of Tarn produced a .22 caliber pistol. The local police placed Tarn and Tuanen Ly on a 
Greyhound bus bound for Salt Lake City. Upon his arrival in Salt Lake City, Tarn was 
arrested by Salt Lake City Police Officers and booked into the Salt Lake City jail. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion and committed error of law in ordering consecutive 
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sentences because Appellant's history, character, and rehabilitative needs do not reasonably 
justify a consecutive sentence under the circumstances. The trial court also abused its 
discretion sentencing Tam to consecutive sentences when it failed to act on reasonably reliable 
and relevant information, and instead relied on a facially biased and unreliable presentence 
investigation report. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT'S CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE DOES NOT REASONABLY 
ACCOUNT FOR THE GRAVITY AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENSES 
AND HIS HISTORY, CHARACTER, OR REHABILITATIVE NEEDS. 
The history, character and rehabilitative needs of Tam dictate against imposition of 
consecutive sentences. Tam was only sixteen years old at the time of the crimes. He had no 
record of prior violent crimes. His court-ordered neuropsychological evaluation showed good 
prospects for rehabilitation (R. 1832). His presentence Time Matrix supports leniency. Ester 
Son testified that Tam was peaceable, somewhat shy, and not violent. R. 1050 11. 22-25, R. 
1051 11. 1-2. Clifton Williams testified with respect to Tam, "he's always been very mild 
mannered, gentle, easy to get along with, easygoing, very non-violent." R. 1181 11.5-7. Dr. 
Vickie Gregory, who performed a comprehensive neuropsychological evaluation testified that 
Tam lacked a rebellious trait typically found in persons convicted of violent crimes and 
frequently in teenagers, of which Tam was both. R. 1586 1. 9 through p. 1587 1. 1. 
Furthermore, Tam testified at trial and told the police in his interrogation that he had been 
sexually abused by the victim making Tam himself a victim. See the Presentence Investigation 
Report at page 2 ("Official Version of Offense") (R. 1784), and at page 4 ("Defendants 
Version of Offense") (R. 1786); See also R. 1648, 11. 18-25 and R. 1647-1653 and 1659-1662 
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generally. The jury must have believed this testimony as they did not find him guilty as 
charged, but of lesser-included offenses, two grades lower in severity on the charge of 
Aggravated Murder, and one grade lower on the charge of Aggravated Robbery. The trial 
court at sentencing certainly had appellant's testimony of abuse by the victim before it and 
should have been influenced by it. Tarn deserved leniency if anything at sentencing. Instead, 
he received concurrent sentences amounting to the maximum sentence the court could give 
him. 
Utah case law strongly supports concurrent rather than consecutive sentences for Tarn. 
In State v. Strunk. 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993), a sixteen-year old defendant pled guilty to 
capital murder, child kidnaping and aggravated sexual abuse of a child, both first-degree 
felonies. Strunk's crime was horrific. Yet the Utah Supreme Court overturned Strunk's 
consecutive sentences and did not even leave the option of consecutive sentences open on 
remand. The court reasoned that imposition of consecutive sentences in Strunk's case "robs 
the Board of Pardons of any flexibility to parole [defendant] sooner." Id at 1301. Despite the 
fact that Strunk's diagnostic report was not optimistic to the prospect of his long-term 
rehabilitation, the court found that "the trial court abused its discretion in failing to sufficiently 
consider defendant's rehabilitative needs in light of his extreme youth and the absence of prior 
violent crimes." IdL. at 1302. Tarn was only sixteen at the time of his offenses, like Strunk, 
and similarly had no history of prior violent crimes, but unlike Strunk, had favorable prospects 
for rehabilitation. And appellant's crimes, though serious, were not nearly as egregious as 
Strunk's. 
In State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995) the Supreme Court strongly reinforced the 
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court's admonition against consecutive sentences set forth in Strunk. In Smith, the defendant 
was not a minor (there is no mention of his age in the opinion), and was a pedophile with a 
prior history of child sexual abuse (Id at 244). Additional aggravating factors included the 
fact the six-year old victim suffered substantial bodily injuries. Despite these factors, the 
Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Smith's sentences to 
run consecutively. The court largely based its holding on this issue on the Legislature's 
enactment of indeterminate sentencing laws and its choice "to give the Board of Pardons wide 
latitude in deciding what a maximum sentence ought to be" (citing Strunk. 846 P.2d at 1301). 
The court went on to reason, "the Board [of Pardons] is in a far better position than a court to 
monitor a defendant's subsequent behavior and possible progress toward rehabilitation while in 
prison and to adjust the maximum sentence accordingly." 909 P.2d at 244. The court further 
stated that Smith's consecutive sentences ffdeprive[d] the Board of Pardons of discretion to take 
into account defendant's future conduct and possible progress toward rehabilitation" (again 
citing Strunk at 1302). 
In both Strunk and Smith the Supreme Court clearly articulates a strong policy in favor 
of concurrent sentences. The message of both these cases is that the Board of Pardons is to 
decide the rehabilitative needs of a defendant, not the court. The court emphasized that the 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant is one of the overriding rationales, if not the principal 
consideration, in determining the length of time a convict serves in prison. The Legislature 
has clearly manifested the intent to substantially shift discretion as to the length of time served 
to the Board of Pardons by enacting indeterminate sentencing laws. 
In addition, by enacting Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401, with its presumption of 
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concurrent sentences, the Legislature created a higher standard for imposition of consecutive 
sentences. The relevant text of that section is fully set forth supra in the Constitutional 
Provisions. Statutes and Rules section of this brief. Subsection (3) states, "A court shall 
consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive sentences" 
(Supp. 1995). For purposes of analysis, this subsection can be broken down into two 
constituent parts. First, a court must consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses. 
Second, the court must look at the history, character and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
In appellant's case, the gravity and circumstances of his offenses call for concurrent 
sentences. While Tarn was convicted of serious crimes, one involving a homicide, the overall 
circumstances do not support a harsh sentence. The crimes were preceded by a sexual 
molestation of Tarn by the victim. This is one of the relatively few facts supported by all 
accounts of the incident.2 This factor, considered with his age at the time of the offense (16) 
strongly favor leniency. The gravity of the offenses of which Tarn was convicted should be 
viewed in relation to the offenses charged. With respect to the charge of Aggravated Murder, 
the conviction of Manslaughter was two categories less severe. The jury finding guilt only as 
to lesser-included offenses demonstrates weaker factual support for the verdict than a verdict of 
guilty as charged would. The evidence of guilt could not have been overwhelming for the jury 
to arrive at a verdict two categories less severe. In addition to those mitigating factors, Tarn 
shares with Strunk and Smith the mitigating factor that their multiple crimes took place during 
2
 See R. 1784 ("Official Version of Offense"); R. 1786 ("Defendant's Version of 
Offense"); R. 1648,11. 18-25 and R. 1647-1653 and 1659-1662 generally; R. 1832 (last 
paragraph). 
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a single criminal episode. An additional mitigating factor for Tam is that he was charged with 
Aggravated Murder on the basis of accomplice or "party" liability under Utah Code Ann. § 76-
2-202. It should be similarly noted that with respect to the charge of Aggravated Robbery of 
the victim's car Tam was not the driver, but the passenger. 
The history, character and rehabilitative needs of the defendant also strongly support 
leniency in sentencing. The defendant's extreme youth, lack of history of violent crime, 
rehabilitative prospects and non-violent character are mitigating factors and were set forth at 
the beginning of this section. In State v. McClendon. 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1980) the 
Supreme Court stated, "A sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the defendant 
in light of his background and the crime committed and also serve the interests of society 
which underlie the criminal justice system." Appellant's sentence was not appropriate for him 
in light of his background and the crimes he was convicted of. Neither does his sentence serve 
the interests of society which underlie the criminal justice system - namely justice and 
rehabilitation of the defendant. 
Furthermore the trial court's consecutive sentence violates Article 1 Section 9 of the 
Utah Constitution. That section states that one convicted of a crime "shall not be treated with 
unnecessary rigor." See State v. Deli. 861 P.2d 341 (Utah 1993). Given Tarn's age, history 
and character, the consecutive sentences are unnecessarily rigorous and should be overturned/. 
Every factor that could be considered in determining the gravity and circumstances of 
appellant's offenses and his history, character, and rehabilitative needs favors leniency for 
Tam. The consecutive sentence ordered by the trial court is clearly an abuse of discretion and 
should be vacated. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACT ON REASONABLY RELIABLE 
INFORMATION IN MAKING THE SENTENCE. 
The trial court abused its discretion when it acted on an unreliable and erroneous 
Presentence Investigation Report ("P.I.R.") prepared by the Adult Probation and Parole office 
and sentenced Tarn to consecutive terms, rather than the usual concurrent terms3. A sentencing 
judge must act on reasonably reliable and relevant information in considering the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of a defendant 
in ordering consecutive sentences. State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993); See 
also State v. Howell. 707 P.2d 115, 117, 118 (Utah 1985), and United States v. Bavlin. 696 
F.2d 1030, 1040 (3d.Cir.1982) (factual matters to be considered as a basis for sentencing must 
have some minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation). The Utah Supreme Court 
held in State v. Johnson that while the evidentiary and procedural standards at sentencing are 
not as strict as those at trial, the evidence relied on by court must nevertheless be reliable. 856 
P.2d at 1071 (quoting State v. Howell. 707 P.2d 115 (Utah 1985)). The basis of the 
requirement to use reasonably reliable and relevant information in sentencing are the due 
process clauses of Article I Section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution. Johnson. 856 P.2d at 1071; Howell. 707 P.2d at 118. The Supreme 
Court further held that "the need for evidentiary reliability in sentencing proceedings is greater 
when specific factual issues must be resolved." Johnson. 856 P.2d at 1071. In that case, 
involving the conviction of the defendant of sodomy and sexual abuse of his common law step-
daughter, the trial court relied on a report from a mental health facility which treated the 
3
 The trial court acknowledges receipt of the Presentence Investigation Report (R. 1783-
1803) at R. 96011. 18-20. 
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victim and another possible victim. The report was based on almost entirely on hearsay, much 
of it contradictory. The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in relying on the report 
which was inherently unreliable in failing to allow the defendant the possibility of parole in the 
sentence. Id. at 1070-1071. 
The trial court's sentence in the instant case is characterized by a defect similar to the 
one which proved fatal to the trial court's sentence in Johnson - the trial court relied on a 
report (here, the Presentence Investigation Report) which is inherently unreliable. In addition, 
in the instant case specific factual issues had to be resolved. There were conflicting accounts 
between the evidence presented at trial and the "Official Version of Offense" in the 
Presentence Investigation Report. The Presentence Investigation Report prepared by C. Todd 
Orgill of Adult Probation and Parole for Appellant's case relies on unsubstantiated hearsay and 
adopts an "Official Version of Offense" which is not reasonably supported by the facts. Unlike 
the Johnson case where the report relied upon by the sentencing judge was based on evidence 
not presented at trial, the P.I.R. in the instant case not only relied on hearsay, it clearly 
adopted a view of the facts unsupported by the jury's verdict and trial testimony subject to 
cross-examination. 
The P.I.R. states that Tarn is "an associate member of the Lost Oriental Boys gang" 
(P.I.R. at p. 12 (R. 1794) but only states in support of that claim, "During the course of the 
interview, the defendant denied being a member of any gang. When asked about the Teardrop 
tattoo, which is often symbolic of gang affiliation, the defendant stated he only received the 
tattoo to minimize the harassment and assaults he was receiving while in jail." Tarn has 
consistently denied any gang involvement activities. The source cited in the P.I.R. is "Salt 
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Lake City Gang Area Project List" (R. 1794). The report does not state the factual basis of the 
statement or anything about how the defendant allegedly got on a list of gang members. If the 
"Salt Lake City Gang Area Project" has reasons for placing Tarn on a list of suspected gang 
members, they should be set forth in the report. This is hearsay of the worst kind and 
completely unreliable. One can only wonder whether the facts that Tarn is an ethnic minority 
and has a short juvenile record of arrests (but no prosecutions) for petty crime led to the 
conclusion of gang involvement. Clearly these reasons do not justify stating that Tarn is a 
gang member. 
The P.I.R.'s "Official Version of Offense" also holds the view that Tarn was downtown 
to engage in sex acts with other males for money (R. 1784). It is difficult to understand how 
this conclusion was arrived at other than through inference and innuendo. There is nothing in 
the interrogation transcript that would reasonably lead one to the conclusion that Tarn was 
downtown to engage in prostitution. In keeping with appellant's duty to marshall the evidence, 
the following passages are the only ones that could be construed to even lend the thinnest 
support to this proposition. Beginning at page 16 of State's Exhibit 31 (Appendix C), third 
question on that page, to page 17 second answer. The last question in the cited section of 
State's Exhibit 31 is a compound question asking about seven separate questions. Tarn's 
response was "yeah." It is most plausible that his response was to the last question, "So you 
met him at 3rd and Main." It is obvious he was not responding in the affirmative to all the 
questions that had just been thrown at him. The next passage begins at page 40 of State's 
Exhibit 31 (Appendix C), last question, and goes to page 41, fourth answer. Tarn said, "he 
said he gives me, he was going to give me twenty dollars." The next question reads, "okay." 
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Tarn then said, "I said no. He started touching me so I pushed his hand away." Clearly Tarn 
was refusing to perform sex acts for money. Yet in the "Official Version of Offense" it states, 
"while en route to an apartment parking lot in the northwest area of the city, the victim agreed 
to pay defendant $20. During the course of the interview, the defendant would not tell 
investigators what sex act, if any, was agreed upon." R. 1784. The report is grossly 
misleading. This last passage gives the impression that Tarn offered to perform sex acts for 
money. The use of the words "the victim agreed to pay defendant $20" implies that there was 
an offer on Tarn's part. There is absolutely no evidence of any such offer. In fact, the 
interrogation elicited the opposite fact. The victim offered to pay Tarn $20, and Tarn refused. 
The "Official Version of Offense" set forth at pages 2 and 3 of the P.I.R. (R. 1784-
1785) appears to be based on the least favorable possible interpretation of a very vague and 
confusing interrogation transcript. Dr. Richard Ofshe, an expert witness on police 
interrogations (R. 1719-20), testified at trial that there were "three big, dark uncharted areas" 
of the interrogation that were "just murky and unclear and they didn't make any sense" (R. 
1736 1. 15 to 1737 1. 7). Dr. Richard Ofshe describes the unclear facts as, one, why was Tarn 
downtown on the evening in question (R. 1737 11. 9-12), two, when Tarn got the gun (R. 1737 
11. 13-19), and three, why Mr. Harris (the victim) would wait in the car alone after Tarn and 
Mr. Ly supposedly left the car until Tarn came back and shot him (R. 1737 11. 20-25; 1753 1. 
25 to 1756 1.17). Dr. Ofshe also testified that by the end of the interrogation these questions 
should have been cleared up but were not (R. 1736 1. 15 to 1737 1. 7). 
The trial court's reliance on the Presentence Investigation Report in the instant case is 
particularly unwarranted for two reasons: one, the report's "Official Version of Offense" sets 
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forth a view of the facts surrounding the offense that is not supported by reliable evidence, and 
which is at odds with trial testimony and the jury's verdict, and two, the "Evaluative 
Summary" of the report, which contains the report's findings and sets out the basis of the 
recommendation, holds to a view of the facts that is not even supported by the report's own 
"Official Version of Offense." In the "Evaluative Summary" section of the P.I.R. at page 16 
(R.1798) it states, "the matter before the Court involves the defendant shooting Chet Harris in 
the throat and head . . . . (emphasis added)." There is absolutely no evidence showing that 
Tarn shot the victim in the head. It was another person, Tuanen Ly, who shot the victim in the 
head killing him. The report further states, "it appears to this agency, there was no significant 
evidence which would substantiate the defendant's claim the victim sexually or physically 
abused him." Mr. Orgill, the report's author, is ignoring Tam's account of being sexually 
molested by the victim which Tarn has maintained from his police interrogation following the 
crime through trial and sentencing. Mr. Orgill also ignores the statements in the 
Neuropsychological Evaluation by Dr. Vickie Gregory that Tarn was the victim of sexual 
molestation and experienced "symptoms of generalized anxiety and symptoms of post-
traumatic stress disorder associated with [Tam's] sexual victimization and trauma when the 
victim was killed" (R. 1832, top of page and bottom paragraph). In fact, the P.I.R. at page 13 
(R. 1795), third paragraph, in the "Mental Health" section refers to Tam's abuse by the victim. 
The "Evaluative Summary" section of the P.I.R. concludes by stating, 
It appears to this agency, the defendant clearly displayed a 
complete disregard for a human life. Based upon the evidence, it 
appears to this agency there was absolutely no justification for the 
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death of Chet Harris. The defendant's demonstration of ruthless, 
cruel, and cold-blooded behavior is a significant factor the Court 
should not overlook." 
R. 1798. 
The Adult Probation and Parole office appears convinced Tam committed cold-blooded murder 
and wants him to pay for it. The jury did not find Tam guilty of cold-blooded murder, but 
instead found him guilty of manslaughter. For some reason, or perhaps they do not have a 
reason, APP does not believe one iota that Tam, a sixteen-year old boy at the time of the 
crime, was sexually molested by Chet Harris, the victim. But based on the jury's verdict, they 
believed Tam was sexually molested by the victim or else they would probably have convicted 
him of at least first-degree murder if not capital murder. Although it is impossible to 
figuratively get inside the head of the jury to know exactly what the jurors believed and did not 
believe, one can infer certain things about their beliefs from their verdict. In short, they did 
not believe Tam committed "cold blooded" murder. Mr. Orgill's belief that Tam did commit a 
"ruthless, cruel, and cold blooded" crime is not supported by the jury's verdict and in effect 
constitutes an attempt to usurp the prerogative of the jury to decide guilt or innocence. Mr. 
Orgill's distortion of the facts of the case was a blatant and unjustified attempt to persuade the 
trial court to sentence Tam to the most severe possible sentence in order to make up for the 
fact that Tam was not in fact convicted of murder. And, the trial court must have relied on the 
P.I.R. because it adopted APP's sentencing recommendation to order consecutive sentences. 
The trial court in effect abrogated its responsibility to decide whether appellant's 
sentences should run consecutively or concurrently to the Board of Pardons. In State v. 
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Hallett. 796 P.2d 701, 703-704 (Utah App. 1990), the Court of Appeals held that the trial 
court erred by leaving to the Department of Corrections the decision whether defendant's 
sentences would run concurrently or consecutively. By adopting the flawed Presentence 
Investigation Report prepared by Adult Probation and Parole the trial court essentially left the 
decision of consecutive or concurrent sentences to the Department of Corrections in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 and contrary to State v. Hallett. 
Evidence that the trial court abused its discretion can be found in the court's comments 
at the sentencing hearing. (The sentencing transcript is found at R. 959-973.) After hearing 
argument from defense counsel and the State, and from some parties on behalf of the victim, 
the trial court addressed Tarn and stated, 
Mr. Nguyen, the Court doesn't know which of your versions to 
accept as true. There are conflicting versions that you've given. 
But even accepting the version that you felt that you were 
assaulted in the light most favorable to you, the touching 
occurred and then there was a period of time to thoughtfully 
consider what you did prior to inflicting the first shot which you 
admitted occurred." 
R. 972 11. 3-11. The trial court seems to have believed that Tarn had a version of the events 
that did not include his being sexually touched by the victim. That is not true. Tarn 
consistently maintained that he had been molested by the victim. It is true that the account he 
gave a trial was more specific and included and account of having been assaulted again in the 
alley behind his home just prior to shooting the victim, but all of Tarn's accounts included a 
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sexual assault by the victim. Furthermore, the trial court states that it was considering his 
accounts in the light most favorable to Tarn, yet goes on to state that there was a period of time 
to thoughtfully consider what he did. In reality, the most favorable view of Tam's account of 
the incident is that he was sexually and physically assaulted and battered immediately prior to 
shooting the victim and would not have had time to thoughtfully consider his actions. The trial 
court had an incorrect view of the facts and abused its discretion. 
The trial court also stated at sentencing, addressing Tarn, "you don't have good 
judgment at age 16 . . . " (R. 972 1. 14). That is true and should have mitigated the severity of 
the sentence under State v. Strunk. 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should hold that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Tarn 
consecutively and remand to the Third District Court for resentencing. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ d a y of January, 1997. 
/James C. Haskins (1406) 
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SUBJECT: NGUYEN, TAM 
THIS IS DETECTIVE CHARLES OLIVER. TODAY'S DATE IS 08-23-93. I'M 
ON THE SIXTH FLOOR, PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION, IN THE HOMICIDE 
INTERVIEW ROOM. THE TIME IS APPROXIMATELY 1940 HOURS. PRESENT 
IS MYSELF DETECTIVE CHARLES OLIVER, DETECTIVE DAVE TIMMERMAN, AND 
A TAM NGUYEN; T-A-M FOR THE FIRST NAME, LAST NAME SPELLING N-G-U-
Y-E-N. DATE OF BIRTH 06-26-77. ADDRESS 877 WEST 300 SOUTH, 
84104. HOME PHONE 532-5344. ALSO PRESENT IN THE ROOM AT THIS 
TIME IS HIS MOTHER, VAN NGUYEN, WHO HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE 
SITUATION AND HAS AGREED TO LET US TALK TO HER SON. 
Q: Is that correct, that we can talk to your son? 
A: Yes, it is okay. 
Q: Okay, okay. Before we do that, in the presence of 
TAM's mother, I'm going to advise TAM, or TOM of his 
rights. 
Okay, do you understand English? 
A: Uh huh. 
Q: Okay, you're going to have to speak up, okay. This 
doesn't get your head nod. Do you understand English? 
A: Yeah. 
Q: Okay. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT. ANYTHING 
YOU SAY CAN AND WILL BE USED AGAINST YOU IN A COURT OF 
LAW. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO TALK TO A LAWYER AND HAVE 
HIM PRESENT WITH YOU WHILE YOU ARE BEING QUESTIONED. 
IF YOU CANNOT AFFORD TO HIRE A LAWYER, ONE WILL BE 
APPOINTED TO REPRESENT YOU BEFORE ANY QUESTIONING, IF 
YOU WISH. YOU CAN DECIDE AT ANY TIME TO EXERCISE THESE 
RIGHTS AND NOT ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS OR MAKE A 
STATEMENT. Do you understand these rights as I have 
explained them to you? 
A: Yeah. 
£-
Okay. HAVING THESE RIGHTS IN MIND, DO YOU WISH TO TALK 
TO ME? 
Yeah. 
Okay. One thing, I want to stop the tape here for one 
second. 
Okay, we are going to continue the interview now with 
Mr. NGUYEN. 
Okay, now we are investigating a homicide, okay? 
Uh huh. 
Of a male black who was found near your house yesterday 
afternoon. Do you understand that? 
What I need to know is, what you were doing Saturday, 
Saturday night, you know, early Saturday; who you were 
with and how you met the black guy and what happened. 
Do you understand that? 
Uh huh. 
Okay, so you need to speak up really loud. And if 




Well, I stayed home until 5 PM. 
Okay. 
Then my friend LEE came down. 
Okay. 
And he stayed at my house til 7:00. 
Okay. 
Then my friend, this girl, came over and picked us up, 
Okay. HAVING THESE RIGHTS IN MIND, DO YOU WISH TO TALK 
TO ME? 
Yeah. 
Okay. One thing, I want to stop the tape here for one 
second. 
Okay, we are going to continue the interview now with 
Mr. NGUYEN. 
Okay, now we are investigating a homicide, okay? 
Uh huh. 
Of a male black who was found near your house yesterday 
afternoon. Do you understand that? 
What I need to know is, what you were doing Saturday, 
Saturday night, you know, early Saturday; who you were 
with and how you met the black guy and what happened. 
Do you understand that? 
Uh huh. 
Okay, so you need to speak up really loud. And if 
you're with other people I need to know their names, 
okay? 
^ 
She's Korean? Does she live in Salt Lake? Do you know 
her phone number? 
No. 
She lives down by you? 
No, she lives by Trolley Square. 
Trolley Square? Okay. How old is she? 
She's seventeen. 
Seventeen? Okay, so then you went out to the Galleria? 
In Murray? 
Uh huh. 
Okay, what time did you get there? 
We got there at around eight. 
Okay, then what happened? 
Then I stayed there til eleven. 
Okay. 
And we took off to the coffee shop on 300 East and 4th 
South. 
Who did you go there with? 
With her and some friends. 
Okay, is LEE still with you? 
Uh huh. 
So you^Went to the coffee shop, what's that called? 
(DETECTIVE TIMMERMAN) That's the Salt Lake Roasting 
Company. 
(DETECTIVE OLIVER) The Roasting Company? Is that for 
sure the place? 
Yeah. 
Okay, so you went there about eleven o'clock? 
Yeah, about eleven thirty. 
Okay, and you were with LEE? 
Uh huh. 
And ESTHER, right? 
Uh huh. 
And some other people? 
Yeah. 
Okay, then what happened? 
Then after we had some coffee, we went up to Capitol 
Hill. 
To Capitol Hill? 
Yeah. We stayed there for about twenty minutes. 
Are you still in ESTHER'S car? 
Uh huh. 
ur 
You went to the Capitol Hill area? 
Yeah. 
Did you get out and look around, or did you ride 
around? 
No, we went up and looked around. 
Okay. Then what happened? 
Then, she drove some of my friends home. 
Uh huh. 
Then me and LEE went downtown. She drove us downtown. 
She drove you, where did she drop you off at? 
West Temple and 4th South. 
West Temple and 4th South. She let you and LEE off? 
Yeah. 
Just you and LEE? 
Uh huh. 
Okay. What was your purpose to go downtown? 
I don't know, he said he wanted to go downtown. 
Okay. Any, any particular reason you can tell us, 
there's nothing, you know, we're not, nothing is going 
to offend us or anything like that. 
No. 
Okay, he just wanted to go downtown? 
Yeah. 
Okay, so she dropped you off at 4th South and? 
West Temple. 
About what time? 
About one o'clock. 
One o'clock? Okay. 
And she left. 
And she left you? 
Yeah. 
So you're on foot at this time? 
Yeah. 
Okay, then what happened? 
Then we walked around downtown until about two thirty, 
I think. 
Just down in the general downtown area? 
Yeah. 




Then about three o1 clock we walked home to my house. 
Okay. You walked home to your house? 
That's right. 
Okay« 
And then LEE went home. 
Then LEE went home? Okay. Then what happened? 
I went inside and slept. 
You went inside and slept? Okay. Then what happened? 
Then that next morning I woke up, LEE came down with a 
friend. 
That next morning? Sunday morning? 
Yeah. Sunday afternoon. 
Sunday afternoon? Who was his friend? 
MINH. M-I-N-H. 
Okay, Sunday afternoon, okay, LEE comes over? 
Uh huh. 
And you spell it M-I-N-H? 
Y e a h 
T h a t ' s h i s \ a s t nar.e? 
rha i " ,'•• h i "i fine. 
What's lis . a s t name? 
Sa-r-
Sam« a s / o u r s T i Inj r el a t i o n ? 
Okay, what Lime did he come over? 
Like noon. 
He asked q&e 11 I wanted to go up to Washington, to 
Seattle, T - - 4 ^ « ^n we started packing, and. 
Washington, Seattle? 
Y e a h , • , • 
ol .i 
i 
Then we walked ever to the next two blocks ana 
t o t h i '- -•-: b • f. e ~ ~ ** ? n ^  T-T ° -i n ^  *• t* n o k o f f . 
Okay, so you were going to Washington, Seattle? 
We reached Washington. 
Okay, how far did you make it? 
To LeGrande. 
LeGrande? 
Then we had a car accident. 
Okay, who was driving it? 
MINH. 
MINH was driving it? 
Yeah. He was driving and he hit the wall and it 
slammed him over to the mountain. 
Uh huh. 
And it spinned him out. 
Where did you find the white car at? 
About two blocks from my house. 
Who's car was it? 
I don't know. 
Who had the keys? 
The keys were in the car. 
M 
They wy j. i, the car? 
Uh huh, 
Okay, - J^ 
Then alter the car crashed, * jumped out and I ran 
across the rtre°*" ^ ^ ^nm^ vi helped me and sent us 
s ome - - - - - - • 
Okay. 
And then the cops came. u n s e M I W H sane n? was looking 
for, went I: o look for help. So someone drove by and 
picked him up and they wen1, •» n to LeGrap'3* 
Okay -
And then about ten
 minutes later these u«w b u J o ^.^^ 
over and picked me and LEE up and they took us for help 
in LeGrande 
Okay, Where is MINH now? 
I don't know 
Did he ccme back with you? When was the 1.i*t lime you 
saw h*•*'"* 
.S t the car eras,]! 
At the car crashY Did you see hi. in nil, II | Il i t a 




 he police station, 
\l^ 
Where did you go? 
We started sleeping by the side of the road. 
How can you have a ticket here? 
I was sleeping when the officer, the cops came over and 
said you can't sleep there. I told them, I told them I 
had a gun with on me. And they gave me the ticket. 
Okay. Where did you get the gun? 
It was with MINH. He said it was in my bag, he left it 
in my bag. 
Oh, he left it in your bag? 
Uh huh. 
So when you got in the car crash you took your bags 
out? 
Yeah. 
But you didnft, you didn't, you didn't leave it in your 
bag, you put it in your pocket? 
Yeah, I put it in my pocket. 
You had it in your pocket? 
Uh huh. 
Okay. 
It wasn't loaded. 
n* O k a y , i t wa . ~ l o a d e a 
b e f o r e ? 
A : " Y e a h a 
III, ! " " I • I *" 
\ij 111 CTJUJ :,. 
;ua i s x t i 
C L I F F * s . 
WILLIAMS. 
A; Uh huho 
Q: Who is CLIFF? 
A : He's a friend. 
A f i" i»'P'i? 
Yeah, 
Did h e g i v e i t t o your' 
No 
^ . W h o ' d h* qi*rn i t !' n } 
A I T s a w t i n . cj IJ in in n In i ' J h i n r . e . 
n 
How do you know it's the same gun? 
I don't know, it just looked the same. 




And he asked me where I'd seen the gun 
Okay, so that's not the same gun? 
I don't know. 
Okay. You're sure that's not your gun? You weren't 
carrying that when you were driving around in Salt 
Lake? Come on, what did we say about telling the 
truth? 
I'm sixteen, I can't buy a gun. 
So what? 
I mean, where can I get a gun? 
Come on, you can get a gun anywhere on the street. 
Well, you've left out the middle part of the story 
here, okay. I know you went to the Galleria and I know 
you went to Washington, and I know you were in the 
murder victim's car. Okay? So why did you leave out 
the middle part? 
What middle part? 
Can you get to shooting the victim, how did the victim 
get shot? 
I don's t know. 
Sure you know. Is that the story you want to stay with 
the rest of your life? You don't know? Ifm not saying 
you did it. Maybe MINH did it, or maybe LEE did it. 
But I know you were there, or j ou wouldn't have got out 
of town, so fast. 
I came up to Washington to see a friend, He lives in 
Washington. 
rHUM^O ilc- ') VCS , ,i r . 
W \ i a t «b 1 ! 11;" 111id k BSS? 
it's in my bay. 
r Ku ;s N G :i. s his aame? 
Yeah, 
How do you spell that? 
T-R-U-N-N-G. 
Is that his *5rst n;une? 
Yeah, 
that's l,,s last name? 
And he lives in Seattle somewhere? 
Y'eah. 
(DETECTIVE OLIVER) Well, youfd better come up with a 
better'story than that. Do you know why? 
Why. 
Because you've got the gun. The gun is in your 
possession, it's in you pocket. The murder weapon is 
in your pocket. Do you understand that? So guess who 
gets to go to jail for doing this murder? You. Unless 
you can come up with a better story. 
Where did you pick this guy up at? You guys 
hitchhiking? 
What guy. 






At 3rd South. 
Okay. Let's get this, let's get that over with, okay? 
We don't, were you down there trolling? 
Huh? 
Were you down there hustling money, standing on 3rd 
South? With your friend LEE? 
No. 
W i n I W e It H I Ml i I t J U I ! I II I I I I III I III I I 
We was just walking around. 
Were you going to roll some guy, looking for some 
money? Beat somebody up? We don't care, that's, 
that's minor to this crime. But" we need to set the 
facts, okay? So we need to know what you are doing, 
did you guys hustle this guy down"there? Or did he 
hustle you? So you met him, at 3rd and Main,, 
Yeaho 
Okay, do you remember what he was w e a r i n g ? 
t o remember. 
an I in0 t! jtrk 1 or me I o s^e . 
Ok a y , Was Id i 11 in i '"' 
He was 111 a c d r . 
h w h i t e c a r . 
I\ i In I e ime f" 
Uh huh . 
Okay. Did you mo t ion t o liii n t o s t o p , or di d he n l o t i o n 
t o yo i i? 
He was j u s t p a r k e d i n t h e r e , 
He was just parked, like they park down there? 
Uh huh.; 
Okay, then what happened? 
Then he said, do you want a ride home, I'll give you a 
ride home. 
Is that you and LEE? 
Yeah. 
Okay, MINH is not with you? 
No, 
(DETECTIVE TIMMERMAN) Was there anybody else with you 
last night, or the night this happened? And you're at 
3rd South and Main. Was it just you and LEE or was 
there another guy with you? 
Just us two. 
(DETECTIVE OLIVER) Okay, so you see this guy parked? 
And. 
And you made contact with him? 
Uh huh. 
And he asked if you guys want a ride? 
Yeah. He said he could only take one. 
He could only take one? 
n 
Yeah. 
Who did he take? Did he take? 
JL/J.U L - ' 2. i 
Wn. h., . . , J I, CJO , 
Sn y mi q t i in the 11 w i th him? 
Yeah. And he drove me over to his apartment on 3rd 
West and South Temple. 
Third West and South Tempier 
Yeah, 
Apartment:? 
11 was in the parking 1 ot behind the apar tments there . 
Yeah. 
I) ::i 1 a n j t h :i n g t: r a n s i; • :i r e ::i n t h e ]: a r k :i :i:i g 1 :i) t ? 
No, we started talking and he started touching me.. 
D i d h e : " u k d i , I i I i- i MI ln.ii i i I li HI iiiii! 11 j i In i u m \ I hi i I 
t i m e ? 
N o 




Is it your gun? 
No. It's not my gun. 
Okay. But it was at your house? 
No, it was, yeah, it was at my house. 
The gun is at your house? 
Uh huh. 
You're not carrying it around with you? 
No. 
Okay. So he starts touching you? Did that piss you 
off, make you mad? 
Yeah. So I told him to drop me back to LEE, where LEE 
was. 
Okay. So then what happened? 
So he dropped me off. 
Okay. Then what happened? 
Then he says "I'm sorry". So he picked LEE up and then 
he drove us home. 
I ^  I 
So he gave you and LEE a ride then' \ 
Yeah. 
Okay, So he takes you over to your house on 3rd South? 
Uh huh. 
Then what happens. You're doing reaiiy good, okay? So 
don't, you know, just tell us what happens Yoi i're 
doing really good, 
Well I told LEE what happened, he touching me 1 n id 
then LEE got mad and said go and get the gun. 
Okay, wa* " ^ •" 
11 -
T f" ' - • u iimc xu uutside, 
It was (jut si tie. 
:Jh huh, 
Was it ! rvad.rd.'" 
Yeah, i t w a s loaded, 
Okay. Did? 
(DETECTIVE TIMMERMAN) Did you say this in English? Or 
did you say it in? 
Vietnamese, 
(DETECTIVE OLIVER) Was the guy waiting for you? 
Yeah, the guy was waiting. 
In front of the house? 
On that, on the little road. 
In the alley? 
Yeah. 
Okay, he's parking in the alley? 
Yeah. 
Is LEE in the car with him? 
No LEE was with me. 
Is he waiting, you owe him some money? Or was you 
going to get him something? What was he waiting for? 
I don't know. 
Okay, but he's waiting for you? Is he expecting you to 
come back out? 
Yeah, I think so. 
Okay, so then what happens? 
So I get, I got the gun. 
I n 
Okay.. 
And he told me to go shoot him. 
LEE did? 
Oh huh. 
So LEE told you to shoot him? Oka- rv.i he tell yoi I 
that in Vietnamese? 
Uh huh 
And you : 
He said he wanted to try out the, the gun, 
LEE wanted to try the gun? 
U0f he told me t o do it. 
01 he told y n11 I i) do it? 
Uh huh. 
Is this in front of your house, or were yoi i out in 
back? 
In the alley. 
ir tr> .;!?;*? ]>> the w.:;" standing right there? 
Yeah, he was standing right there. 
Okay, is he i n his car sitting down? Or is he standing 
up? 
H e f s s t a n d i n g t h e r e . 
By h i s car? 
Uh huh. 
Do you know which way his car is facing down the alley? 
Is it facing North? 
It fs facing.. 
(DETECTIVE TIMMERMAN) Is it facing your house or 
facing south towards 4th South? 
Facing the north. 
(DETECTIVE OLIVER) North? Okay. So LEE tells you to 
shoot him. I guess itfs dark outside, isn't it? 
Uh huh. 
It's about three in the morning? Okay. What did you 
do? 
So I took the gun and I shot him. 
You took the gun and you shot him? 
Uh huh. I hit him on the chest. 
You hit him in the chest? 
And he fell down. 
Okay. Then what did you do? 
Then we got in the car and started to leave. Then we 
just come back to see if he was dead. 
w 
So you ,, guys came back? 
Yeah, and u u ^ - - was crawling. 
He w as craw1i ng ? 
He he wa s n"t dead. 
He? wasn/l dead? 
P nnl M'if I,I'll'! hmli I hfi qun and shot him in the head. 
Then LEE shot him in the head? So you're saying you 
shot the first one and hit him somewhere, you thi \ >.k in 
the chest? 
It was in the chest. 
I n ( he t ion! tn: Lin. 1JL1L.IL , 
In the back, In the front. 
Right in the front? Is that,, about whereabouts did you 
hit him7 
About right here. 
.it uppe^ c?;^  ? 
Uh huh. 
Okay. He f e l l down? 
Yeah. . . 
Okay., Did you get in his car and take off? 
Uh huh. 
Okay. Then LEE says "Let's go back and see if he's 
still alive"? Is that right? 
Yeah. 
Okay. And you are drive, how far away did you get from 
your house in the car? 
About two blocks. 
Okay. So about two blocks and you decide to turn 
around and go back? 
Yeah. 
Okay, did you shine the headlights on him? Could you 
see him crawling down the alley? Or did you pull the 
car down the alley? 
When we were driving down the alley he was crawling. 
He was crawling down the alley? Was he crawling toward 
your house or was it the other way? 
He was crawling north. 
North? Okay. Was he like on his hands and knees, or 
staggering on his feet, or? 
He was just, his hands. 
Okay. So you guys, did you pull the car down the 
alley? 
Yeah, we drove down the alley. 
The headlights on? 
No headlights were on. 
Okay. Then, did you see him? 
Yeah, I saw him. 
Okay, then what did you do? 
Then LEE told me, he told me to give him the gun. So 
we stopped. And he ran up and he shot him in the heado 
Did you see him shoot him in the head? 
No I only heard the gunshot. 
Okay* Did he tell you later he shot him in the head? 
Yeah. He did. 
Then what happened? 
Then we started moving. 
Did you push him or shove him or hit him wix:n m e car 
or anything? 
No. 
So you don't know where he ended up? 
No. 
Okay. Then what did you do? 
Then we parked the car about two or three blocks away 
from the house. 
Okay, Then what? 
Then we went into my house and we packed. And LEE went 
home. 
Okay. When did you go to Washington? 
We packed and 





Early evening. When did you shoot him, Friday night or 
Saturday night? 
Saturday. 
Saturday night. So you drove all the way up there and 
got in the crash? What time did you get in the crash 
this morning? 
One AM. 
One AM? So you had to leave Salt Lake about what? 
Three or four yesterday afternoon? 
Uh huh. 
Okay, that would be about right then. Then you got, 
just you and LEE? 
And MINH. 
v\ 
Oh, MINH went with you? But there is no way he was 
involved in the murder? Because we don't want to get 
him in trouble if he didn't do it. 
No. 
Are you positive? 
Yeah. 
Did you guys talk about it on the way up there? Does 
he know you guys did it? 
Yeah. 
Okay, was he worried? 
Yeah, he was worried. He was the one driving. 
He was the one that was driving? Okay. Did he know 
you were leaving Salt Lake because you did this crime 
and wanted to go up there? Or were you going up there 
anyway? 
No, we were just going up after the crime. 
Were you going to come back? 
Yeah. 
Okay. You're sure that's what happened? And that's, 
that's pretty much what happened? 
Uh huh. 
Did you throw? What did you do, did you take, after 
you guys shot him, did you steal his wallet or his 




He dropped the keys on the ground. 




And we took the keys and ran. 
And you took the keys and ran? 
Uh huh. 
You or LEE? 
I did. 
Okay. Do you remember what he was wearing? 
No. 
Okay. Do you remember when you were driving his car, 
did you find his wallet in the car or any 
identification or any ID cards or anything in his 
wallet in his car? Did you find a wallet and take any 
money out or anything? Is there a wallet in there, do 
you know? Any identification? 
No. 
And you're sure there is no identification? 
r*v 
I don't know what you mean. 
Okay. So you didn't find his wallet in the car? 
I think the cops did when we was up there. 
Did they? But you never saw it while you guys were 
driving the car? So the cops did find a wallet in the 
car? 
That's what they told us. 
It must have been under the seat or something, you guys 
didn't look? 
No, 
Okay, Do you, how many, you shot him twice, how many 
was in the gun? 
Five. 
Five? Where are those bullets now? 
They're all gone. 
Did you shoot them all up? 
Uh huh. 
Where at? 
At, when we were driving. 
When you were driving? 
Uh huh. 
Is that! all you had, was five bullets? 
Uh huh. 
Okay. 
I had some more, but they were in the suitcase, 
Was there some in your suitcase, in your bag? There's 
some bullets in there? 
Yeah. 
Okay, same type that was in the gun? 
Uh huh. 
Okay. When you first went with him behind West Temple, 
when you picked him up? Did anything sexual happen 
between you guys? After he started touching you? I 
mean, did you know what you were getting into, have you 
been in that position before? You're sure? 
Uh huh. 
Cause that, you know, we don't care about that, okay? 
(DETECTIVE TIMMERMAN) It doesn't really matter. I 
mean, it's obvious to us that you guys went to 3rd 
South and Main. I mean, you know what, you knew goes 
on down there. Right? I mean, didn't you? 
But we was just walking around. 
(DETECTIVE OLIVER) Well, but what were you doing down 
there specifically? Why were you at 3rd South and 
Main? 
I don't know. 
What* did you guys plan something out? 
No. 
Were you trying to make some money? What was going on? 
I don't know. 
But not being, not being sexual, did it scare you or 
did you tell you didn't like to do it, or? 
Yeah, he scared me. 
Okay. Did he give you any money? 
No he didn't. 
Are you sure? 
Yeah. 
Okay. 
(DETECTIVE TIMMERMAN) What did he say to you, did he 
say anything to you when this happened? 
When he was driving me to the parking lot, he said he 
wanted my body* 
(DETECTIVE OLIVER) He wanted your body? 
Uh huh. 
Okay. 
(DETECTIVE TIMMERMAN) Anything more specific? 
He started touching me, you know, on my parts and 
stuff. 
(DETECTIVE OLIVER) Okay. 
So he told me to 
Okay. Did you have to tell him to knock it off, or? 
Yeah. I told him to don't do it, you know. 
Okay, did he get physical with you or make any threats 
or was he mad when you stopped his advances or 
anything? 
Yeah, he was angry. 
Okay, so you said knock it off, take me back to my 
friend? 
Uh huh. 
And that's about it, he did? 
Yeah. 
Okay, how long do you think you were with him? 




(DETECTIVE TIHMERMAN) What kind of car is it that you 
guys were driving in? His car? 
I don't know, it was white. 
It was white? Was it a four door, or a two door? 
I don't' know. Two. 
Do you know, was it a Ford or a Chevy, or? 
I don't know. 
Or was it a smaller Japanese car? 
I don't know. 
You don't know? 
No. 
You drove it then for a long time, are you sure you 
don't know what kind of car it was? 
I don't. 
What grade are you in? 
Eleventh. 
Eleventh grade? Are you going to school? 
Yeah. 
What school, what school are you supposed to go to? 
East High. 
op 
So, after you did it you thought maybe we'd better go 
to Seattle and let things cool down? Okay. Were you 
planning on coming back to Salt Lake? 
Yes. 
Okay. Did the officers up in LeGrande get you guys a 
bus ticket and put you on the bus? 
Yeah. 
Okay. How come you didn't get off the bus somewhere 
else? 
Cause I wanted to come back home. 
You wanted to come back home? 
Yeah. 
Okay. Thatfs good. Anything else DAVE? 
(DETECTIVE TIMMERMAN) Yeah, only one more thing. When 
you guys came back, when this black guy agreed to give 
you ride home, you and LEE; what did you guys tell him 
that made him wait in the alley? You must have said 
something to him to get him to stay there and wait for 
a little while. What did you say? 
I said, "Wait for me." 
Okay, anything else? 
That's all. 
(DETECTIVE OLIVER) You didn't say you was going to get 
him some dope or you'd give him some money or? 
He was drunk. 
Was he drunk? 
Yeah. 
He'd been drinking? 
Uh huh. 




Um, I didn't see the name. 
Okay, he offered you some beer? 
Yeah, he offered me some beer. 
Did you have a sip? 
No. 
No? But he had some beer in the car? 
Uh huh. 
Okay. 
(DETECTIVE TIMMERMAN) He didn't, he didn't offer to 
give you money or anything? He didn't say he would pay 
you or anything like that? 
No. 
(DETECTIVE OLIVER) Did LEE go in the house with you 
when you went in to get the gun, or in the backyard or 
wherev**- you went? Did LEE stay out and talk to him? 
Uh huh. 
Okay. 
(DETECTIVE TIMMERMAN) Where in the backyard did you 
have the gun, where was it at? 
It was on the roof. 
On the roof? 
Yeah. 
On which side of the house? The front or back? 
In the back. 
In the back? Now it looks like therefs kind of like a 
patio or something on the, added on to the back. Is 
that where it was, or? 
Yeah. 
Was it underneath something, or was it just laying 
there? 
It was laying there. 
Where did you get the gun? 
Where did I get the gun? 
Yeah. 
I don't know. 
You don't want to tell us that? 
(DETECTIVE OLIVER) Youfve done real good, you've done 
well. Wherever you got the gun, they arenft in 
trouble, because you used the gun, okay? 
Uh huh. 
But we'd just like to know. Because we're going to 
trace it anyway, but, you know, you could just save us 
a"lot or work. 
It's not reported stolen or anything. 
Well, how did you know? 
Cause the cops told me. 
Up in? 
Uh huh. 
So where did^ you get it? 
(DETECTIVE TIMMERMAN) Somebody give it to you or did 
you steal it from someplace? 
I didn't steal it. I was keeping it. 
For? 
For a friend. 
(DETECTIVE OLIVER) Okay, and who is the friend? 
I don't know. 
You don't want to give up the friend? 
No. 
Okay, well you've told us enough that we'll respect 
that right now, okay? Is that a fair deal? 
Yeah. 
Okay, we, we won't ask you that any more then. Right 
now. How long have you had the gun, just let me put it 
that way? 
About a month. 
About a month? Have you ever fired it before? 
No. 
Okay, but you knew how to operate it. Did this, did 
the black guy, was he able to communicate with LEE? He 
didn't speak your language did he? 
No. 
Does LEE speak English? 
A little bit. 
A little bit. Not as good as you? 
Huh uh. 
Anything else DAVE? 
(DETECTIVE TIMMERMAN) Only one more thing. And not to 
keep pushing this thing because I know you aren't 
comfortable, okay, talking about this sex part of it, 
anybody would be. Alright? And we want you to know 
that we are professionals and that is, that's not an 
important issue to us, okay? You have given us a lot 
and you've been very cooperative and we appreciate 
that. But when he took you, uh, to the alley, did he, 
did he agree to pay you some money, did he say anything 
to you about what kind of money he would give you or 
anything? 
(DETECTIVE OLIVER) Are you sure? 3ecause that's very 
important. You don't know? 
(DETECTIVE TIMMERMAN) Like I say, understand, you need 
to know that CHUCK and I both worked vice. Okay, we've 
both been at times in vice and so we know what goes on 
down there. We've even arrested a lot of guys down in 
that area. For that very thing. So what, all I'm 
asking you is to be truthful about that, I know you're 
uncomfortable with it, and I appreciate that. Okay? 
But all I need to know is exactly what he said and if 
he did give you money, what it was, or if he offered to 
give you money, what he told you about that. 
Well, he told me he wanted my body. 
Okay. 
He said he gives me, he was going to give me twenty 
dollars. 
Okay. 
I said no. He started touching me so I pushed his hand 
away. 
Okay. 
And he went and took me back, 
Now, now just one more thing and then I won't dwell en 
this at all. The touching part, did he just touch you 
en your clothes or did he try to reach inside your 
pants, or what happened? 




Okay, and you said no. 
Yeah. 
Did, did he continue, did you have to take or push him 
or anything to get him to stop? 
No. 
He stopped? 
I just told him to stop. 
(DETECTIVE OLIVER) When you got in the car with him, 
where did you think you were going? 
Home. 
You thought hefd give you a ride home? Even though LEE 
stayed there? 
Uh huh. 
Okay. And you're sure you and LEE have never done that 
type of stuff before? Never been down to 3rd and Main? 
No. 
Okay. 
(DETECTIVE TIMMERMAN) How did you, how did you find 
out about 3rd South and Main? Friends tell you about 
it? 
Uh huh. 
(DETECTIVE OLIVER) WE'RE GOING TO STOP THE INTERVIEW NOW FOR A 
FEW MINUTES. THE TIME IS 2010. 
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